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Abstract 
Two experiments examined whether different task ecologies influenced 
insight problem solving. The 17 animals problem was employed, a pure 
insight problem. Its initial formulation encourages the application of a direct 
arithmetic solution, but its solution requires the spatial arrangement of sets 
involving some degree of overlap. Participants were randomly allocated to 
either a tablet condition where they could use a stylus and an electronic tablet 
to sketch a solution or a model building condition where participants were 
given material with which to build enclosures and figurines. In both 
experiments, participants were much more likely to develop a working solution 
in the model building condition. The difference in performance elicited by 
different task ecologies was unrelated to individual differences in working 
memory, actively open-minded thinking, or need for cognition (Experiment 1), 
although individual differences in creativity were correlated with problem 
solving success in Experiment 2. The discussion focuses on the implications 
of these findings for the prevailing metatheoretical commitment to 
methodological individualism that places the individual as the ontological 
locus of cognition. 
 
Keywords: Problem solving, insight, task ecology, enactivism, methodological 
individualism 
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Insight with Hands and Things 
 
1. Introduction 
The psychology of problem solving has, over the years, split its research 
efforts tackling so-called analytic or transformation problems and insight 
problems. The former are well-defined problems with simple operators that 
can be applied to transform the initial problem presentation through a series of 
intermediate states—each intermediate state is a move in a logically 
specifiable problem space—to reach a desired configuration; the Tower of 
Hanoi or river crossing problems are good examples. In turn, insight problems 
are less well defined with no immediately obvious or effective operators that 
can be applied to transform the initial presentation into a solution. This is 
because insight problems are formulated in a manner that encourages a 
misleading interpretation and obscures a path to solution. For example, how 
can 17 animals be placed in four pens in such a manner that there is an odd 
number of animals in each pen? (to adapt a problem reported in Metcalfe and 
Wiebe, 1987). The problem masquerades as an arithmetic one, but an 
arithmetic solution is impossible (with whole animals/numbers); rather, a 
solution is possible when pens are projected as sets that can overlap.  
The focus of the theoretical efforts for transformation problems is usually 
the effectiveness with which participants traverse the problem space, and 
performance is measured in the number and type of moves participants 
produce to reach the goal state. These efforts lend themselves to 
computational modelling of the move selection heuristics allegedly employed 
by participants. In turn, theoretical efforts for insight problem solving have 
focused on the processes that lead to a new interpretation, or restructuring of 
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the problem representation that helps participants overcome an impasse and 
identify plausible solutions. The nature of the processes that result in insight 
has been the subject of some debate. One camp, inspired by Köhler’s 
(1921/1957) ethnographic observations of the apparent suddenness of 
insight, suggest that largely unconscious and automatic processes evince a 
restructured mental representation of the problem—for example, Ohlsson’s 
(1992) representational change theory and its more recent incarnation, 
redistribution theory (Ohlsson, 2011). Another camp holds that, like for 
transformation problems, insight solutions are distilled through conscious 
analytic processes that may or may not involve the restructuration of a mental 
representation (e.g., Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013; Weisberg, 2015). There 
are two important features of the current debate about the mental processes 
implicated in insight problem solving. The first relates to the role of working 
memory; the second reflects a metatheoretical commitment to methodological 
individualism. Let’s take each in turn. 
If insight problem solving proceeds on the basis of a conscious analysis 
of the constituent elements of the problem and their relation, then one would 
expect measures of effortful cognitive analytical processing such as working 
memory capacity to be correlated with problem solving performance. On the 
other hand, if processing was largely unconscious, then working memory 
capacity might not be so relevant in the process of achieving insight. Using an 
individual differences approach, Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) invited 
participants to solve series of insight and non-insight problems—from which 
composite performance scores were derived—and profiled their participants in 
term of verbal and visuo-spatial working memory using complex sentence, 
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operation and visual pattern span tasks to determine the degree with which 
working memory measures correlated with the composite solution rate score 
for both types of problems. Verbal and visuo-spatial working memory span 
performance significantly predicted variance for both insight and non-insight 
problems. Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) interpreted these findings in terms of 
the storage demands of keeping a rich problem representation in working 
memory such as to enhance the probability that “key elements (…) will be 
represented and available for reinterpretation” (p. 373). Working memory 
measures are strongly correlated with traditional measures of intelligence 
(e.g., Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Oberauer, Schulze, 
Wilhelm, & Süß, 2005), and in turn measures of intelligence correlate with 
performance on insight problem solving (Davidson, 1995; Frederick, 2005). In 
like vein, research on individual differences in reasoning (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 1998, Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014) reveals that participants 
who score high on measures of intelligence, tend to engage in more rational 
thinking in a wide range of reasoning tasks. That research also implicates 
thinking dispositions in reasoning performance. Thus measures of open-
minded thinking or willingness to engage in effortful thinking correlate with 
more rational thinking performance (Stavonich & West, 1998; Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, Jarvis, 1996).
A focus on cognitive capacities and thinking dispositions reflects a deep 
and pervasive commitment to methodological individualism, defined by 
Malafouris (2013, p. 25) as “the foregrounding of the human individual as the 
appropriate analytic unit and ontological locus of human cognition”. This 
commitment naturally encourages researchers to develop task procedures 
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devoid of real-world meaning, goals and utilities, and that limit or prevent 
interactivity with the physical features of a problem, with the aim to identify 
‘pure’ cognitive processes under controlled laboratory conditions (Vallée-
Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2016). This commitment deflects attention 
away from the context of reasoning, and reinforces the focus on the capacities 
that an individual brings to a reasoning task. Yet, thinking and reasoning do 
not take place in a vacuum, and there is much evidence that systematic 
manipulations of task instructions, external representations, and artefacts can 
substantially transform deductive reasoning (e.g., Manktelow & Over, 1991), 
hypothesis-testing behavior (e.g., Gale & Ball, 2006; Vallée-Tourangeau & 
Payton, 2008; Vallée-Tourangeau, 2012), transformation problem solving 
(Zhang & Norman, 1994; Guthrie, Vallée-Tourangeau, Vallée-Tourangeau, & 
Howard, 2015), mental arithmetic (Carlson, Avraamides, Cary, & Strasberg, 
2007; Lave, 1988; Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013), Bayesian reasoning (Vallée-
Tourangeau, Abadie, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015) and insight problem solving 
(Weller, Villejoubert, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2011). These context and 
representational effects encourage a transactional perspective on cognition. 
From this perspective, the cognitive capacities of the reasoner and the 
features of the context cannot be fruitfully segmented and their causal role 
defined orthogonally in the explanation of performance. A reasoner is 
embedded in a certain task environment that together configures a certain 
cognitive ecology within which certain cognitive abilities are manifested.  
This transactional perspective encourages the exploration of the role of 
interactivity in problem solving (Steffensen, Vallée-Tourangeau, & Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2016). In an interactive problem-solving environment, a problem 
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is presented with manipulable constitutive elements. Take for example the 
matchstick arithmetic problems developed by Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and 
Rhenius, (1999). The problems employ roman numerals in the shape of 
matchsticks that configure false arithmetic expressions (e.g., XI = III + III) that 
can be turned true by moving one matchstick (e.g., VI = III + III). However, in 
the original procedure employed by Knoblich et al. (and in their subsequent 
eye tracking experiment, Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001), the problems 
are presented on a computer screen and participants cannot manipulate the 
problem elements (and in the eye tracking experiment, even the participants’ 
movements are constrained by the requirement of biting into a bar to stabilize 
the head and ensure more accurate eye tracking data). Participants stare at 
the computer display and mentally simulate matchstick movement; the 
perceptual feedback is invariant. Performance on this task is substantially 
transformed using a procedure wherein participants can manipulate the 
matchsticks (Weller et al., 2011). Moving a matchstick changes the physical 
appearance of the problem, prompts and guides new actions, and insight 
solutions are enacted through this dynamic cycle. Actions need not be 
premeditated; rather, simpler perception-action loops may shape, at different 
stages of the problem solving trajectory, the evolving physical configuration of 
the problem (Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2015). An interactive problem solving 
environment foregrounds the importance of actions and the changes in action 
affordances wrought by the changes in the physical appearance of the 
problem. These reflections on research methodology, and the findings 
reported in Weller et al., suggest that the task ecology and the type of 
interactivity that it permits are important determinants of problem solving 
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performance, above and beyond internal resources such as working memory 
capacity.  
1.1 The Present Experiments 
The primary aim of the experiments reported here was to determine 
whether different types of interactivity within different task ecologies 
influenced insight problem-solving performance. Both experiments employed 
the 17A problem, a pure insight problem according to the classification offered 
in Weisberg (1995). The 17A problem presents itself as involving an 
arithmetic solution yet this is only possible through the spatial arrangement of 
sets involving some degree of overlap (see Fig. 1). Two different task 
ecologies were created. In one, participants were given artefacts to build a 
model of the solution. They could not sketch a solution using a pen; only the 
material with which to build enclosures and 17 animal figurines were provided. 
In the second task environment, participants were invited to sketch a solution 
using a stylus and an electronic tablet. In that condition, no artefacts could be 
manipulated to spark ideas as participants drew their solution of the problem 
on the tablet.  
We predicted that the type of interactivity—afforded by the task ecologies—
would determine successful performance with the 17A problem. We expected 
a substantially higher rate of solutions in the model building condition, and this 
for two principal reasons. First, without the means to write down numbers and 
doodle various arithmetic operations, the focus on an arithmetic solution 
should more quickly dissipate in the model building than in the tablet 
condition. Second, building a model of the solution forces participants to tinker 
with the shape and spatial arrangement of the enclosures. Thus actions may 
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enact a different path to solution, one that does not involve the brute labour of 
dividing 17 into 4 odd numbers.  
To explore the importance of internal resources in problem solving, we also 
measured participants’ cognitive capacities and thinking dispositions to 
determine whether they predicted problem-solving performance similarly in 
the two ecologies. Thus, in Experiment 1 we measured working memory 
capacity with two complex span tasks, an operation and a symmetry span, to 
establish participants’ ability to maintain verbal and visuo-spatial material in 
working memory when concurrently performing simple arithmetic operations 
or symmetry judgments. If a change of representation is the product of an 
effortful cognitive process, as suggested by Kaplan and Simon (1990), 
measures of working memory capacity should predict performance on the 17A 
problem. In addition to cognitive capacities, we measured participants’ 
disposition to engage actively in open-minded thinking (Baron, 1985)—i.e., 
the willingness to revise beliefs and abandon hypotheses in the face of 
contrary evidence—and need for cognition, participants’ attitude toward and 
motivation for engaging in effortful thinking. These measures may predict how 
quickly participants abandon the unworkable application of a direct arithmetic 
solution, and hence their ability to formulate a solution involving overlapping 
sets. In Experiment 2 we sought to establish independently participants’ 
creativity with the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviour (Batey, 2007) 
and the alternative uses task (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 
1978): more creative individuals may more often discover the overlapping-set 
solution. Finally, since the 17A problem is presented and initially interpreted 
as an arithmetic problem, Experiment 2 also profiled participants in terms of 
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numeracy and mathematics anxiety. That is, more numerate participants who 
are less anxious about mathematics, may more quickly and more confidently 
realise that the solution to the problem cannot involve the division of an odd 
number into four odd numbers, without a remainder. 
Figure 1. Possible solutions for the 17A problem. 
 
2. EXPERIMENT 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Fifty psychology undergraduate and postgraduate students (44 females) 
received course credits for their participation (Mage = 24.2, SDage = 8.1): 
Participants were randomly allocated to either the tablet condition (n = 24) or 
the model condition (n = 26). We used the sample sizes of prior studies where 
significant interactivity effects on problem-solving were demonstrated (e.g., 
Guthrie et al., 2015) to determine our stopping rule for the size of our sample. 
Such a sample size provides enough statistical power (i.e., 80%, assuming α 
= 5%, two-tailed test and unconditional exact test) to detect OR = 0.17 in 
success rate between the two conditions. 
2.1.2 Procedure 
2.1.2.1 Problem Solving Task. Participants were invited to solve the 
following problem: “How do you put animals in four enclosures in such a 
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manner that there is an odd number of animals in each of the four pens?” All 
participants were first presented with a pen and blank sheet of paper and 
given three minutes to sketch possible solutions to the problem. No participant 
knew the solution to the problem or sketched overlapping pens during that 
initial period. After an interval of approximately 25 minutes—during which they 
completed a working memory test, see below—participants were allocated to 
either the tablet or the model condition and were given 10 additional minutes 
to solve the 17A problem. Participants in both conditions worked on the 17A 
problem on a table (118cm X 74cm) in an observation laboratory fitted with an 
overhead camera that recorded participants’ sketching and model building 
efforts.  
2.1.2.1.1 Tablet. In this condition, participants were given a stylus and 
an electronic tablet (14.8cm X 19.7cm) with which to sketch a solution to the 
17A problem; participants could draw and erase their workings with the stylus. 
The participants’ sketches were saved as MP4 video clips.  
 
Figure 2. The ‘zebras’ used in the model condition of Experiment 1. The 
zebras were 3cm high, 2.5cm long, with a maximum width of 1cm. 
 
2.1.2.1.2 Model. In this condition, participants were given approximately 
20 pieces of pipe cleaners varying in length (short 20cm and long 30cm 
pieces) and 17 zebra paper clips (see Fig. 2). The pipe cleaning pieces were 
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always placed to the left of the participants on the work table, the heap of 17 
animals in front, and the problem statement to the right. Participants did not 
have a pen or piece of paper with which to sketch their solution; rather they 
had to build a model of the solution.  
2.1.2.2 Individual Differences. Participants were profiled in terms of 
working memory capacity as well as their style of thinking and attitude 
towards thinking. 
2.1.2.2.1 Working Memory. Participants completed two working 
memory tasks, an operation span and a symmetry span. Both span tasks, 
developed by the Georgia Tech Attention and Working memory lab (and used 
with permission), are automated tests, administered with E-Prime, each 
lasting 20-25 minutes—the timing of some of the elements in these tests is 
tailored to the average speed with which participants solve the arithmetic or 
symmetry problems during a practice session (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & 
Engle, 2005).  
In the operation span, participants are presented a series of letters to 
remember, each letter presentation is preceded by a simple arithmetic 
expression, such as (2*3) – 1 = ?, followed by a proposed answer which 
participants must judge as true or false. Letter series range in length between 
three and seven and three sets of each length is presented to participants. 
After each series, participants are shown a 4x3 array of letters—composed of 
letters that were part of the series and some that were not—and they click on 
each of the letter they remember as composing the series in the correct order 
of presentation. Participants’ total number of correctly recalled letters over all 
series was used as the first measure of working memory capacity.  
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In turn, the symmetry span is an automated adaptation of the Corsi 
(1972) block test. Participants are presented with a series of coloured cells (or 
block) in a 4x4 matrix. Before the presentation of each block, participants are 
shown an 8x8 matrix with some cells coloured in black and are asked to 
determine whether the resulting pattern of black boxes is symmetrical along 
its vertical axis (see Unsworth et al., 2005). The series of coloured blocks 
varied in length between two and five, and participants were presented three 
sets of each length. After a set was presented, participants were prompted to 
click on a blank 4x4 grid the location of each coloured block and in the right 
order. The total number of blocks correctly recalled—out of a possible 42 
across all sets—was the second measure of working memory capacity.  
2.1.2.2.2 Need for Cognition. We adapted the short form of the need 
for cognition scale developed by Cacioppo, Petty and Kao (1984). We used 
the same 18 items but participants rated their endorsement with a 6-point 
scale (instead of a 5-point scale) anchored at 1 (completely false) and 6 
(completely true) for items such as “I would prefer complex to simple 
problems”, “I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems” and “Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much” (this 
is a reverse coded item). The reliability of the Need for Cognition scale was 
excellent with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89. 
2.1.2.2.3 Actively Open-minded Thinking. We used the 7-item actively 
open-minded thinking scale reported in Haran, Ritov and Mellers (2013). 
Using a 7-point scale (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) 
participants rated their agreement with statements such as “People should 
revise their beliefs in response to new information or evidence” and “It is 
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important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear 
against them” (this is a reverse coded item). The reliability of the AOT scale 
was relatively poor with a Cronbach’s alpha of .51.  
The experimental session began with either the operation or symmetry 
span task (counterbalanced across participants), then the AOT and Need for 
Cognition scales (their order also counterbalanced), the three-minute 
preliminary problem solving period, the second working memory span task, 
and then the 10-minute problem solving period.  
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Problem Solving Performance 
None of the participants solved the problem during the initial three-
minute period. All participants sketched answers (see Fig. 3 for an illustration) 
that clearly illustrated an interpretation of the problem as requiring an 
arithmetic solution. After a 25-min working memory assessment interval, 
participants were given an additional 10 minutes to solve the problem, either 
using a stylus and an electronic tablet to draw a solution, or using pipe 
cleaners and ‘zebras’ to build a model of the solution. Of the 24 participants in 
the tablet condition, none solved the problem in the 10-minute period (see Fig. 
4, Panel B, for illustrations of the participants’ sketching). That is, participants 
worked for the entire 10-minute period on discovering how an odd number 
could be split into 4 odd quantities, a mathematical impossibility with natural 
numbers. Thus participants in the tablet condition were never able to abandon 
the original problem interpretation and attempted to discover an arithmetic 
solution. Having said this, two participants in the tablet condition, at one point 
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in their work, drew something that resembled overlapping sets but 
nonetheless subsequently laboured a direct arithmetic solution.  
 
Figure 3. Impasse measured during an initial 3-minute attempted solution to 
the 17A problem in Experiment 1. No participant in either the tablet or the 
model group sketched a solution to the problem during this initial period. 
 
Of the 26 participants in the model condition, three systematically 
clipped the zebras onto the pipe cleaners during the 10-minute problem 
solving period. This was indeed an affordance of the artefacts employed in the 
model condition, but an unforeseen one when the material was initially piloted. 
In effect, by clipping the zebras onto the pipe cleaners, these participants 
could never discover the solution to the problem, since an animal could not be 
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placed into more than one pen simultaneously. This type of problem solving 
trajectory would not have been possible had we chosen any other type of non-
clipping figurines to correspond to the ‘animals’ in the problems. As a result,  
Figure 4. Examples of participants' solutions, partial solutions, and incomplete 
solutions after working for 10 minutes on the 17A problem in the model (A) 
and tablet (B) conditions of Experiment 1 and in the model (C) and tablet (D) 
conditions of Experiment 2. 
 
we chose to remove these three participants from all subsequent analyses. Of 
the remaining 23 participants, 6 solved the problem outright (see Fig. 4, Panel 
A) and 4 offered partial solutions—that is solutions with overlapping sets, but 
ones for which a set intersection is taken as a separate pen, and while there 
is an odd number of animals in each resulting enclosure, this results in a five-
pen solution. Of the 13 who did not solve the problem, 3 worked with 
overlapping sets but were unable to arrange the animals in a correct manner, 
and 10 build enclosures that never overlapped.  
Solvers n = 6 Partial Solvers n = 4 
Overlappers n = 3 Non-solvers n = 10 
Figure X. Examples of participants' solutions, partial solutions, and incomplete solutions after working 
for 10 minutes on the 17A problem in the model building (A) and tablet (B) conditions of Experiment 1 
and in the model building (C) and tablet (D) conditions of Experiment 2.  
Solvers n = 6 Partial Solvers n = 4 
Overlappers n = 3 Non-solvers n = 10 
A 
B 
C 
D 
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To avoid the issues with an empty cell we used a Barnard’s exact 
unconditional test instead of the chi-square test; Barnard’s test is considered 
to be a more powerful and less constrained alternative to the Fisher’s exact 
test (e.g., Lydersen, Fagerlans & Laake, 2009). Thus 10 participants provided 
full or partial solutions to the problem in the model condition, compared to 
none in the tablet condition, a significant difference using the Barnard’s exact 
unconditional test (3.64, p < .001).  
2.2.2 Individual Differences 
Participants’ scores on the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) tests, 
the Need for Cognition scale, as well as on the two working memory tests—
Cohen's
M SD M SD t p d
AOT
Solvers - - 34.2 5.0
Non-solvers 32.1 4.3 30.5 5.6
Overall 32.1 4.3 32.1 5.5 -0.004 .997 0.001
nCog
Solvers - - 75.3 14.2
Non-solvers 73.4 13.0 75.7 14.0
Overall 73.4 13.0 75.5 13.8 -0.539 .593 0.160
O-Span
Solvers - - 51.5 7.5
Non-solvers 53.5 11.1 53.5 10.4
Overall 53.5 11.1 52.7 9.1 0.286 .775 0.085
S-Span
Solvers - - 26.8 9.2
Non-solvers 26.2 7.5 26.8 9.7
Overall 26.2 7.5 26.8 9.3 -0.268 .790 0.079
Tablet Model
Table 1
Mean Scores (and SD) on the Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT) and Need for 
Cognition (nCog) scales, and Mean (and SD) Working Memory Capacity Scores, as 
Assessed with an Operation Span (O-Span) and a Symmetry Span (S-Span), for 
Solvers and Non-solvers in the Tablet and Model Groups of Experiment 1.  t Values 
Refer to Group Differences (df = 45).
Note. There were no solvers in the tablet group; the 'solvers' in the model group include the 6 correct solvers and 
the 4 partial solvers.
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the Operation and Symmetry Spans—are reported in Table 1. Participants in 
both groups scored the same on these measures—as we would expect with 
the random participant allocation—and there were no significant differences 
between groups; the largest difference was observed for the Need for 
Cognition scores, t(45) = -.539, p = .593. Thus, problem solving performance 
differences between groups cannot be attributed to differences along these 
thinking and working memory dimensions. Finally, we compared solvers and 
non-solvers in the model group. Here too success at solving the problem was 
unrelated to these individual differences, with the largest non-significant 
difference observed with the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale, t(21) = -
1.627, p = .119. 
2.3 Discussion 
The 17A problem is a hard problem. After working on the problem for a 
total of 13 minutes—the initial 3-min sketching phase plus the 10 minutes in 
either one of the two experimental conditions—none of the participants in the 
tablet condition formulated a solution, while 43% built overlapping sets that 
led to a full or partial solution in the model building condition. On the basis of 
the participants’ preliminary sketches, all interpreted the problem as one 
involving the direct application of arithmetic operators to yield a solution. 
Participants’ arithmetic focus was unwavering in the tablet condition: they 
primarily worked on dividing 17 into four odd numbers, often by listing odd 
numbers from 1 to 17 and attempting to combine four that would tally up to 
17. If pens were drawn, they were rarely modified once sketched, and 
remained as an unchanging and non-overlapping configuration of four 
separate areas throughout the problem solving session. In contrast, in the 
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model condition, participants’ attention and actions were directed, from the 
start, on the pens themselves. As a result, the spatial configuration of the 
pens, rather than quixotic attempts to divide 17 into four odd numbers, was for 
some participants the focus of their problem solving efforts. Thus, it is through 
the manufacturing and manipulation of the pens that some participants 
overcame the impasse: the action of building and re-building pens, especially 
in the absence of a stylus with which to sketch arithmetic operations, helped 
some participants to relax the initial focus on a direct arithmetic interpretation 
of the problem. Problem solving success was driven by the action repertoire 
afforded by the task environment. With pipe cleaners, participants worked on 
the pens, and some managed to create overlapping structures which enabled 
them to work out the distribution of individual animals. With a stylus, 
participants tackled the problem as in a more traditional pen and paper 
scholastic maths exercise, never achieving the required number-enclosure 
figure-ground inversion (see also Steffensen et al., 2016), and enclosures 
always remained an invariant perceptual background over which numbers 
were manipulated and superimposed.  
Participants in the first experiment were profiled in terms of their 
dispositions to be actively open-minded thinkers and enjoyment in poring over 
difficult problems. Scores on neither dimension differentiated participants in 
the tablet and model building conditions, nor between those who formulated 
an overlapping solution and those who did not in the model building condition. 
In terms of working memory capacity, participants in the two groups did not 
differ either on their scores for the operation or the symmetry span. Similarly, 
no significant differences were observed in terms of working memory capacity 
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between solvers and non-solvers in the model building condition. Problem 
solving success was determined by the task environment, the range of actions 
it afforded and the dynamic changes to the physical problem presentation 
evinced by these actions.  
In the second experiment we aimed to replicate these findings using 
different artefacts and explore additional individual differences. One can 
hypothesize that a number of material properties determine the trajectory of 
insight: Pens can be formed with pieces of varying length, height, weight, 
rigidity and adhesion. They can even be formed by pre-given surfaces in 
different shapes and sizes. We conjectured that overlap-ability might be more 
easily enacted with hoops. In addition, overlapping hoops or circles are 
commonly encountered in the teaching of algebra of sets, as well as having 
common cultural symbolic currency (e.g., the Olympic rings, the front grille 
adornment of a German luxury car). The second experiment also avoided 
using artefacts for animals that could clip onto the perimeters of the pens. We 
improved the experimental procedure by showing participants allocated to the 
tablet condition a picture of the hoops and animal figurines before they 
sketched an answer to the problem. Thus the perceptual starting point was 
the same in both the tablet and model building conditions. 
In the second experiment we explored other individual differences. First 
we sought to establish whether independent measures of creativity could 
predict problem solving success. Second, because the problem is initially 
interpreted as requiring the application of a direct arithmetic solution, 
participants who are less numerate or experience mathematics anxiety might 
not be sufficiently confident to discard the unworkable arithmetic strategy. We 
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thus assessed the levels of subjective numeracy and maths anxiety. Finally, 
we also measured impulsivity: We conjectured that participants who scored 
high on impulsivity might more quickly abandon a certain problem solving 
trajectory and try something new, which may eventuate in loosening the focus 
on the arithmetic interpretation of the problem. 
3. EXPERIMENT 2 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Forty-seven undergraduate and postgraduate students (38 females) 
received course credit for their participation (Mage = 21.5, SD = 4.73). 
Participants were randomly allocated to either the tablet (n = 23) or model (n = 
24) condition. We used the same rationale as for Experiment 1 to determine 
our stopping rule for the sample size.  
3.1.2 Procedure 
Participants worked on the 17A problem using the same problem 
statement as in Experiment 1. However, unlike in Experiment 1, participants 
were not given pen and paper to sketch a solution during a three-minute 
preliminary phase. As in Experiment 1, participants in the tablet condition 
were given a stylus and an electronic tablet to sketch a solution. In the model 
building condition, participants were given 4 metal hoops (each 20-cm in 
diameter) and 17 animal figurines. Figure 5 illustrates the material employed 
in the model condition. Note that this image was also shown to the 
participants in the tablet condition. 
3.1.2.1 Individual Differences. Participants were profiled in terms of 
their creativity, impulsivity, numeracy, and mathematics anxiety. 
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3.1.2.1.1 Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours (Batey, 
2007). Participants completed a checklist of 34 different creative behaviours 
they might have engaged in during the past 12 months, such as “draw a 
cartoon”, “started a club, association or group”, “composed a poem”. Scores 
reflected the number of items ticked. 
Figure 5. Material in the model condition of Experiment 2. The hoops had a 
diameter of 28cm. The animals were ‘cows’, 2.5cm high, 3.5cm long and 2cm wide. 
 
3.1.2.1.2 Alternative Use Task (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & 
Wilson, 1978). Participants were asked to generate as many alternative uses 
of a brick during a three-minute period. We only scored fluency based on how 
many unique uses were generated. 
3.1.2.1.3 Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995). Participants completed the 30-item BIS, using a 6-point scale 
(1 = “Never”, 6 = “Always”) to answer items such as “I do things without 
thinking”, “I have racing thoughts”, “I concentrate easily” (reverse coded). The 
scale’s reliability was acceptable: Cronbach’s alpha = .78 
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3.1.2.1.4 Numeracy. Numeracy was measured using the subjective 
numeracy scale developed by Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, 
Derry, and Smith (2007). This scale is composed of eight items (such as “how 
good are you at calculating a 15% tip”). Participants answer using a 6-point 
scale (1 = “not good at all” and 6 “extremely good”). The sum ratings was the 
subjective numeracy score. Fagerlin et al. report strong positive correlations 
with this subjective measure and objective numeracy measured with series of 
arithmetic problems. The scale showed good reliability with Cronbach’s alpha 
at .84. 
3.1.2.1.5 Mathematics Anxiety. Participants completed a 25-item 
Mathematics Anxiety Scale-UK (MAS-UK; Hunt, Clark-Carter & Sheffield, 
2011). The questionnaire invited participants to imagine how anxious they 
would feel in certain situations (1 = “not at all” and 5 = “very much”), such as 
“Working out how much your shopping bill comes to” or “Taking a maths 
exam”. The scale had excellent reliability: Cronbach’s alpha = .92. 
Three separate orders of the different scales were created to mitigate 
order effects with two constraints: (1) the 17A problem was always presented 
as the second task and (2) the numeracy and maths anxiety scales were 
always presented at the end of the experimental session. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Problem Solving Performance 
Four participants (or 17%) solved the 17A problem in the tablet 
condition, while 13 (or 54%) did in the model building condition, a significant 
difference, χ2(1, N = 47) = 6.88, p = .009, Cramer’s V = .383. Compared to 
Experiment 1, significantly more participants produced a correct solution to 
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the problem in Experiment 2, χ2(1, N = 94) = 6.97, p = .008, Cramer’s V = 
.272. 
3.2.2 Individual Differences 
The mean scores on the measures of individual differences are reported 
in Table 2. Overall, the groups did not significantly differ on any of the five 
dimensions; largest non-significant difference was with the BIS scores, t(45) = 
-1.52, p = .135. Table 3 reports the correlations among the different measures 
Cohen's
M SD M SD t p d
BICB
Solvers 11.0 5.7 9.7 4.8
Non-solvers 6.9 4.0 6.1 2.3
Overall 7.6 4.5 8.0 4.1 -0.345 .732 0.103
AUT
Solvers 7.3 2.6 6.4 3.2
Non-solvers 4.5 2.2 3.6 2.6
Overall 5.0 2.4 5.1 3.0 -0.156 .877 0.046
BIS
Solvers 96.5 20.9 100.3 14.3
Non-solvers 94.7 9.6 101.8 16.9
Overall 94.8 11.6 101.0 15.8 -1.522 .135 0.454
SNS
Solvers 37.5 9.1 29.7 9.4
Non-solvers 28.7 7.0 25.9 8.0
Overall 30.3 7.9 28.0 8.5 0.960 .342 0.286
MAS
Solvers 45.5 5.4 52.2 18.8
Non-solvers 54.2 11.6 64.8 22.0
Overall 52.7 11.2 58.0 20.5 -1.086 .283 0.323
Tablet Model
Table 2
Mean Scores (and SD) on the Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours (BCIB), 
the Alternative Uses Task (AUT), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS), the 
Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS), and the Mathematics Anxiety Scale (MAS) for 
Solvers and Non-solvers in the Tablet and Model Groups of Experiment 2.  t Values 
Refer to Group Differences (df = 45).
Note. There were 4 solvers in the tablet group and 13 in the model group.
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of individual differences as well as the point-biserial correlations with problem 
solving success in the tablet and model conditions. We note the negative 
correlations between measures of numeracy (SNS) and mathematics anxiety 
(MAS) in the tablet, r(21) = -.75, p < .001, and model condition, r(22) = -.409, 
p = .047. Impulsiveness (BIS) was positively correlated with maths anxiety in 
the model condition, r(22) = .59, p = .002, although not in the tablet condition, 
r(21) = .08, p = .724.  
Of more interest are the point-biserial correlations with problem solving 
success. Measures of creativity were positively correlated with success, 
particularly output on the Alternative Uses Task in the tablet, rpb(21) = .43, p = 
.040, and model condition, rpb(22) = .47, p = .022. Scores on the Biographical 
Inventory of Creative Behaviours were positively correlated with success in 
the model condition, rpb(22) = .45, p = .029, although not significantly so in the 
tablet condition, rpb(21) = .35, p = .097. Finally, numeracy was positively 
correlated with success in the tablet, rpb(21) = .43, p = .041, but not in the 
model condition, rpb(22) = .23, p = .287. 
3.3 Discussion 
The second experiment sought to establish the importance of the 
artefacts employed in determining problem solving success as well as 
whether measures of creativity, impulsiveness, numeracy and mathematics 
anxiety correlated with discovering the solution to the 17A problem. As in 
Experiment 1, participants were more likely to build an overlapping set 
solution in the model condition than to sketch one in the tablet condition. In 
addition, a significantly greater number of participants discovered the solution 
in the second experiment than in the first experiment. Participants’ experience  
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Table 3. 
Intercorrelations for Problem Solving Success and Measures of Creativity (BCIB, AUT), Impulsiveness (BIS), Numeracy (SNS) and 
Mathematics Anxiety (MAS) in the Tablet (Left Panel) and Model Groups (Right Panel). 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 BCIB -- 1 BCIB --
2 AUT .141 -- 2 AUT .172 --
3 BIS .124 -.180 -- 3 BIS -.115 -.319 --
4 SNS -.040 .244 -.316 -- 4 SNS .370 .070 .079 --
5 MAS -.127 -.202 .078 -.749 ** -- 5 MAS -.346 -.397 .593 ** -.409 * --
6 Success .354 .431 * .027 .429 * -.302 -- 6 Success .445 * .467 * -.049 .227 -.314 --
Tablet Group Model Group
Note. BICB = Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours; AUT = Alternative Uses Task;  BIS = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; SNS = Subjective Numeracy 
Scale; MAS = Mathematics Anxiety Scale. The correlations with Success are point-biserial correlations. * p < .05 ** p < .01
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with hoops and their commonly encountered arrangements outside the 
laboratory might have contributed to the enhanced solution rate in Experiment 
2. Furthermore, since participants did not have to build the enclosures, 
relatively more time could be devoted to tinkering with set arrangements than 
in Experiment 1.  
A number of material parameters may determine the problem solving 
trajectory. The model condition can be designed in a number of different 
ways: Pens can be constructed with pieces of varying length, weights, and 
rigidity. The resulting pens can have a certain height and weight. Pens can be 
presented as ready-made forms—such as the hoops in Experiment 2—which 
can also vary in shape and size. Variations of the figurines and work space 
are also possible. Our aim was not to determine the optimal physical 
parameters that lead to the highest rate success in the 17A problem. Rather, 
unlike current models of problem solving, such as Ohlsson’s (2011) 
redistribution theory or Fleck and Weisberg’s (2013) integrated framework, an 
ecological perspective encourages that kind of analysis and helps understand 
differences in solution rates as a function of the physical parameters of the 
thinking environment.  
While task ecology had a substantial impact on problem solving success 
in Experiment 2, independent measures of creativity were associated with 
solving the 17A problem. In both the tablet and model condition, higher 
response outputs in the Alternative Uses Task (AUT) was associated with 
producing a correct solution, and higher scores on the Biographical Inventory 
of Creative Behaviours (BICB) was correlated with success in the model but 
not in the tablet condition. It is interesting to note that while scores on the 
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Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviours were positively correlated with 
response fluency in the Alternative Uses Task, these correlations were not 
significant. This is perhaps not surprising. The BICB records protracted 
activities that are deemed creative. These activities also require effort, 
commitment, motivation and resources. In turn, the AUT reflects an agility of 
mind that drives the generation and simulation of alternative uses of a 
common object in a very short time span. Such ability may not be necessarily 
implicated in bringing to completion acts such as “starting a club”, “making 
someone a present” or “acting in a dramatic production”, which are among the 
items that compose the BICB. In turn a high response fluency may reflect a 
participant’s drive to explore different spatial configurations in the 17A 
problem. While we conjectured that measures of impulsivity might correlate 
with success at the task, scores on the BIS and solving the 17A problem were 
unrelated. Finally, higher levels of subjective numeracy were associated with 
solving the problem in the tablet but not in the model condition. This pattern 
suggests that higher numeracy is helpful is relaxing the arithmetic constraint 
in the tablet condition. In the model condition, that constraint is more easily 
discarded through the manipulation of sets, and hence numeracy contributes 
to a lesser extent to problem solving success. 
Beyond individual differences in creativity and numeracy which may 
underpin performance in the interactive context, participants may vary in their 
willingness to interact with the artefacts presented, that is, vary along a 
dimension of instrumentality. In other research (Vallée-Tourangeau, Abadie, & 
Vallée-Tourangeau, 2015) we have found evidence that not all individuals 
react in the same way when presented with manipulable objects. When 
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presented with a pack of cards to support their solving of a complex statistical 
reasoning problem, some participants only made minimal actions on the cards 
(i.e., making mainly “marking actions” that had no obvious epistemic or 
perceptual impact on the physical layout). By contrast, other participants were 
more likely to engage in transformative actions, that is presentation change 
actions that significantly changed the perceptual layout. These participants 
were also more likely to correctly solve the problems they were working on. 
Future research may investigate differences among people in their willingness 
or ability to engage with material artefacts. 
4.General Discussion 
Theoretical accounts of insight problem solving focus on the mental 
processes that enable participants to overcome an impasse (e.g., Fleck & 
Weisberg, 2013). A fundamental assumption of these accounts is that 
problem solving proceeds on the basis of a mental representation of the 
problem and changes to this representation that may eventuate in an action 
plan that provides a solution to the problem. An important correlate of this 
framework is that “representational change processes do not correspond to 
any particular overt behaviors” (Ohlsson, 2011, p. 113). Since representations 
must be kept active in some mental workspace, working memory capacity has 
been implicated in insight problem solving, and indeed positive correlations 
between measures of working memory and insight problem solving 
performance have been reported (e.g., Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009). However, 
research on insight problem solving commonly employs procedures that 
prevents or limits interaction with a physical presentation of a problem, a form 
of cognitive sequestering (Vallée-Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). 
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By limiting or eliminating interactivity with a physical model of the problem, 
problem solving must inevitably proceed on the basis of a representation of 
the problem, and hence research efforts complacently validate rather than test 
the representational assumptions of the prevalent paradigm.  
A reviewer of a previous version of this manuscript pointed out that 
earlier work on insight problem solving involved actions with material 
artefacts, making specific reference to Duncker’s (1945, p. 86) “box problem” 
and Maier’s (1931) “tying strings” problem. Indeed, some of the pioneering 
work on the psychology of insight problem solving in the first few decades of 
the 20th Century involved participants (and in the case of Köhler’s 
ethnographic research, chimpanzees) working on problems that were 
presented with various objects and involved physical interaction. However, 
this work was conducted from a Gestalt perspective, and neither Duncker or 
Maier put any emphasis on the constitutive role of interactivity in the genesis 
of insight. Duncker used the box problem to investigate functional fixedness 
and compared solution rates between conditions involving pre-utilization 
(boxes filled with other objects, such as matches) or without pre-utilization 
(empty boxes). Duncker’s analysis did not focus on actions leading to solution 
(how to affix a candle onto a vertical surface) and his perspective on problem 
solving was firmly internalist, labouring as sharp a contrast as possible with 
behaviourist and associative models of problem solving. Maier (1931), like 
Duncker, casts problem solving as reflecting the re-organisation of mental 
elements. At the end of his original paper on the two-string problem he writes 
(p. 193): “The perception of the solution of a problem is like the perceiving of a 
hidden figure in a puzzle-picture. In both cases, (a) the perception is sudden; 
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(b) there is no conscious intermediate stage; and (c) the relationships of the 
elements in the final perceptions are different from those which preceded, i.e., 
changes in meaning are involved”. Maier (1930, 1931) was concerned with 
how certain hints would spark such a sudden re-organisation, not how an 
agent’s action dynamically modified a problem presentation in leading to 
insight.  
Outside the psychologist’s laboratory, however, problem solving involves 
interacting with resources external to the reasoner (Kirsh, 2013); solutions are 
distilled on the basis of a great deal of interaction with the material world. 
From an ecological perspective, cognition evolved to ensure the dynamic 
coupling between an organism and its environment through interactivity 
(Anderson, 2014; Järvilehto, 1998). We would argue that an important, albeit 
implicit, reason for failing to comment on the role of interactivity in problem 
solving is the methodological and theoretical commitment to formulating an 
explanation in terms of mental processes that transform a mental 
representation of the world. Solving problems, however, outside the cognitive 
psychologist’s laboratory first involves changing the world. That is, problem 
solutions are reflected in changes in the world; these physical changes are 
the evidence of a solution. Problem solving in the world involves tools, maps, 
models—some readymade models as those used in teaching organic 
chemistry (Toon, 2011), some reflecting constructions using artefacts at 
hands, like the table top model of a city’s landmarks described in Noë 
(2012)—and unfolds within a set of spatio-temporal coordinates. Solving 
problems in the world primarily involves action: To solve problems is to act in 
the world. 
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At one level of analysis, participants in the experiments reported here 
solved the same problem in both the tablet and model conditions. But the 
cognitive ecologies were very different, and arguably different in the model 
condition of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The cognitive ecosystems (cf. 
Huchins, 2010) implemented in the tablet and model conditions were 
populated with different tools, arrayed in a different physical space, prompted 
and cued a different range of actions. Participants enacted different hunches 
and explored different paths to solution in these different ecologies. The 
problem was more easily restructured when participants engaged in model 
building activity. The genesis of insight can be understood as an enacted 
phenomenon produced through the interactivity that couples an agent to the 
material world. A mentalist perspective focusing on internal processes that 
restructure a mental representation does not alert researchers to the 
importance of interactivity and the materiality of the artefacts that populate the 
ecosystem. While a mentalist perspective may acknowledge the role of the 
environment in shaping internal representations, the associated ontological 
and methodological commitments make it difficult to predict how problem-
solving performance may differ in environments that support different types of 
interactivity.  
4.1 Trajectory to Solution: Singular and Contingent 
The idea explored in this paper is that interactivity is an ontological 
substrate (Steffensen, 2013), that is that new ideas emerge through material 
engagement. In other words, engaging with the material world is an enabling 
condition for conceptual change (see also Malafouris, 2015, on plasticity 
through interaction with artefacts). In the model condition, a hunch is reified 
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into a working hypothesis through interacting with a dynamic problem 
presentation, using material that encourages the construction of the key item 
in the problem solution, namely the pens. However, insight is not the 
mechanical result of certain actions or triggered once the physical 
presentation of the problem has been configured in a certain way. The 
importance of an action or of a perceptual cue is granted by its contingent 
occurrence at a certain point in time; certain actions are important or cues 
significant by virtue of their temporal context, that is by virtue of what has 
gone on before. The path to discovery for each solver is a singular and 
contingent trajectory: no single action or perceptual cue is necessary to break 
the initial arithmetic impasse.  
Given the singularity of the solution path woven through action, a 
detailed qualitative analysis of each participant’s effort is required, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However single micro-detailed case analyses 
of individual participants offer telling a telling window onto the origin of new 
ideas, what Steffensen (2015) termed the probatonic principle. That principle 
is at the heart of Steffensen’s (2013) cognitive event analysis, which we 
applied to one of the 6 successful participants in Experiment 1 of the present 
paper; this case study is reported in Steffensen, Vallée-Tourangeau, and 
Vallée-Tourangeau (2016). Steffensen et al. offered a micro analysis of the 
actions and evolving physical configurations of the 17A problem: the 10-
minute problem solving session was coded in terms of 1291 separate 
annotations, for an annotation density of 2.152 annotations per second (for 
comparison, Anzai and Simon’s [1979] “microscopic account“ of a participant 
solving the Tower of Hanoi was based on 232 annotations during a 90-minute 
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session and thus yielding an annotation density of 0.043 annotations per 
second). As with all other participants in the model condition, this participant 
spent the first few minutes building pens (in her case, 1:52 minutes to be 
exact). In this preparation phase, three overlapping configurations were 
accidentally produced and were promptly disassembled to restore a 
configuration involving four non-overlapping enclosures. For the next 3:47 
minutes of the problem solving session, the participant attempted to distribute 
the 17 animals in the four separate enclosures. There followed a 26-second 
phase during which she took all the zebras and put them in a heap in the 
middle of the work table. In effect, there was a figure-ground inversion, where 
the pens rather than the animals became the focus of her attention. She then 
re-adjusted one of the pens, apparently to fashion it into a less oblong and 
more circular shape. Because the pipe cleaning material is so light their 
chenille texture can turn into velcro when coming into contact with other pipe 
cleaning pieces, and in the process of adjusting one pen, it encroached on an 
adjacent one and dragged it across to create two overlapping pens. Micro-
coding of her action revealed that she proceeded to remove the overlap but 
inhibited her action just as her hand was about to reach one of the pens. 
Within the next few seconds, she created two additional overlaps such that 
the four pens were arrayed in a U shape, each one overlapping with the next, 
creating three intersections. For the next 1:24 minutes the participant worked 
out the distribution of the animals such as to meet the problem requirement.  
This micro-analysis of one participant working on the 17A problem 
revealed a few important points. First, no specific action or perceptual 
configuration taken in isolation leads to a solution. Rather, their role in 
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shaping problem solving efforts depends on the preceding contingent 
trajectory. For example, overlapping configurations can be encountered but 
this perceptual information may not trigger a different way of dealing with the 
problem. Thus, to understand the origin of new ideas and the overcoming of 
impasse, the temporal trajectory of the participant’s progress should be 
analysed. Second, materiality matters. Thus the properties of the pipe 
cleaning pieces in themselves guide the problem solver along a certain path, 
what Ingold (2010) refers to as the textility of making. Third, material 
engagement creates chance configurations that may prompt different ways of 
tackling the problem (Kirsh, 2014).  
The work reported here does not proceed from a radical enactivist view 
that aims to jettison all talk of mental representations (e.g., Chemero, 2013; 
Hutto, 2005). Problem solving reflects a relation between external resources 
and internal representations; to adapt Malafouris (2015), we would argue that 
insight is an ‘in-between’ process. It may well be easier to identify and 
measure features of the thinking agents rather than the features of the 
broader cognitive system within which they are embedded. We think, 
however, that it is not fruitful to attempt an orthogonal segmentation of the 
different internal and external components of the system that is configured by 
the meshing of internal and external resources through interactivity. The 
ontology of insight is relational, internal and external resources are mutually 
constitutive in a transactional process. Insight is operationalised in terms of 
agent-induced changes in the external resources. 
In a classic paper, Zhang and Norman (1994) discussed the role of 
external representations in non-insight transformation problem solving. Using 
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a size-reversed Tower of Hanoi task, Zhang and Norman elegantly varied how 
move selection constraints could be embedded in the physical artefacts 
employed to represent different isomorphic versions of the task. As the 
number of rules represented externally increased, problem solving 
performance—as gauged in terms of solution latencies, moves and error—
improved. According to Zhang and Norman external representations expand 
memory capacity, can be directly perceived, and transform the nature of the 
task. We certainly concur. However, Zhang and Norman worked with a non-
insight problem with a fully specifiable problem space that can explicitly map 
all the possible moves from the initial to the goal state (which then permits 
“the explicit decomposition of the representational system of a distributed 
cognitive task into its internal and external components”, p. 120, that they 
prescribe). That kind of analysis is not possible with an insight problem. More 
important, the data presented here point to the importance of interactivity and 
underscore the contingent nature of the spatio-temporal trajectory of insight 
problem solving, a trajectory enacted on the basis of interactivity (Vallée-
Tourangeau & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014).  
In both experiments, participants were randomly allocated to either 
condition. As a result, cognitive capacities and thinking dispositions were 
equated. In Experiment 1, no participant formulated a solution in the tablet 
condition; their failure to do so cannot be attributed to sub-normal working 
memory capacity or poor thinking dispositions. Nor could working memory 
capacity and thinking dispositions explain differences between solvers and 
non-solvers in the tablet condition. This is likely due to the contingent nature 
of the problem solving trajectory. As the problem presentation is modified, it 
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dynamically unveils different paths, some promising, some leading to a cul-
de-sac. For example, in Experiment 1, some participants in the model 
condition wove pipe cleaners to create tagliatelle nests, presumably to 
prevent animals from ‘jumping’ over the pen’s perimeter. Such structures 
however are not conducive to the creation of overlapping sets. As a result, 
once participants make this design decision, the problem solving trajectory 
cannot eventuate in a solution to the problem. Model building in Experiment 2 
used pre-formed hoops and as such participants could not build enclosures 
that prevented the development of overlapping configurations. In addition, we 
conjectured that hoops might guide reasoners along a more productive 
trajectory because they are artefacts commonly associated with overlapping 
configurations. The latter feature in itself, though, was insufficient to spark 
insight since fewer than 20% of the participants in the tablet condition solved 
the problem. Rather, it is the physical interaction with the physical elements of 
the model that is an important driver of insight.  
4.2 Methodological Implications and Recommendations 
Our findings have important implications for the psychology of problem 
solving. Understanding how people solve problems must proceed from an 
appreciation of the dynamic coupling between a reasoner and her 
environment. The recent integrated framework of insight problem solving 
offered by Fleck and Weisberg (2013) was informed by verbal protocols of 
participants as they worked through a series of insight problems, some 
presented with artefacts that could be manipulated to alter the problem 
configuration (e.g., the triangle of coins), others not—e.g., the water lilies 
problem also used in the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005). Fleck and 
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Weisberg reported but did not comment on the fact that, in their data, 
restructuring was more likely to occur when participants could manipulate the 
physical elements of a problem (Vallée-Tourangeau, 2014). They probably did 
not comment on this feature of their findings because they did not assume it 
would make a difference: If cognition only takes place in the head, it should 
not. But the problem solving data reported here clearly show that it makes all 
the difference. To understand how people solve problems we need to 
understand how different task ecologies, with different properties and 
affordances, may encourage different problem-solving trajectories. Qualitative 
analyses reflecting a detailed coding of actions and the resulting dynamic 
configuration of the problem presentation—with its shifting topography of 
affordances—will likely offer a better explanation of how, why and when 
someone achieves insight (Steffensen et al., 2016). Methodologically this 
program of research can only proceed by ensuring that interaction with the 
physical constituents of a problem presentation is possible.  
We can anticipate how such interactive task procedures may be 
integrated and complemented with verbal protocols, to determine how 
participants’ on going narrative anticipate or follow certain actions (and 
provide important data concerning the phenomenology of insight in interactive 
environments). In addition, eye-tracking data may offer a better gauge of the 
allocation of attention (e.g., how shifts in visual attention precede certain 
actions, how new problem configurations garner sustained attention at 
different stages of the problem solving trajectory). Such research efforts would 
then measure action, visual attention, and verbal narrative, considerably 
enhancing the richness and granularity of the analysis and help identify which 
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actions are intentional and which reflect the relatively unmediated reaction to 
an environmental affordance. Such method may also reveal the relative 
proportions of unmediated actions reflecting swift perception-action cycles 
and those that reflect the intentional implementation of a plan at different 
stages of the spatio-temporal trajectory. 
  
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  40 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Erica Mundhal for her help in developing some of the 
experimental material, and Emily Dewar, Pani Fanai-Danesh and Angie Makri 
with help recruiting and running participants for Experiment 2. We thank the 
Georgia Tech Attention & Working Memory Lab for the use of the working 
memory capacity tests employed in Experiment 1.  
  
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  41 
References 
Anderson, M. L. (2014). After phrenology: Neural reuse and the interactive 
Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Anzai, Y., Simon, H. A. (1979). The theory of learning by doing. Psychological 
Review, 86, 124-140. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.86.2.124 
Batey, M. D. (2007). A psychometric investigation of everyday creativity. 
Unpublished PhD dissertation. University of London. 
Baron, J. (1985). Rationality and intelligence. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., & Kao, C. F. (1984). The efficient assessment of 
need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306-307. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). 
Dispositional difference in cognitive motivation: The life and times of 
individuals varying in need for cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 
197-253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.197 
Carlson, R. A., Avraamides, M. N., Cary, M., & Strasberg, S. (2007). What do 
the hands externalize in simple arithmetic? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 747–756. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.33.4.747 
Chemero, A. (2013). Radical embodied cognitive science. Review of General 
Psychology, 17, 145-150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032923 
Corsi, P. M. (1972). Human memory and the medial temporal region of the 
brain. Unpublished PhD dissertation, McGill University.  
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  42 
Davidson, J. (1995). The suddenness of insight. In R. J. Sternberg and J. E. 
Davidson (Eds.), The nature of insight (pp. 125-155). Cambridge MA: 
The MIT Press. 
Duncker, K. (1945). On problem solving. Psychological Monographs, 58(5), i-
113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0093599 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. (1999). 
Working memory, short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: A 
latent-variable approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
128, 309-331. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.128.3.309 
Fagerlin, A., Zikmund-Fisher, B. J., Ubel, P. A., Jankovic, A., Derry, H. A., & 
Smith, D. M. (2007). Measuring numeracy without a math test: 
Development of the Subjective Numeracy Scale. Medical Decision 
Making, 27, 672-680. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989X07304449 
Fleck, J. I., & Weisberg, R. W. (2004). The use of verbal protocols as data: An 
analysis f insight in the Candle problem. Memory and Cognition, 32, 
990-1006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03196876 
Fleck, J. I., & Weisberg, R. W. (2013). Insight versus analysis: Evidence for 
diverse methods in problem solving. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 
25, 436-463. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2013.779248 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 19, 25-42. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732 
Gale, M., & Ball, L. J. (2006). Dual-goal facilitation in Wason’s 2-4-6 task: 
What mediates successful rule discovery? Quarterly Journal of 
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  43 
Experimental Psychology, 59, 873–885. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02724980543000051 
Gilhooly, K. J., & Fioratou, E. (2009). Executive functions in insight versus 
non-insight problem solving: An individual differences approach. 
Thinking and Reasoning, 15, 355-376. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780903178615 
Guilford, J.P., Christensen, P.R., Merrifield, P.R., & Wilson, R.C. (1978). 
Alternate uses: Manual of instructions and interpretations. Orange, CA: 
Sheridan Psychological Services. 
Guthrie, L. G., Vallée-Tourangeau, F., Vallée-Tourangeau, G., & Howard, C. 
(2015). Learning and interactivity in a transformation problem. Memory 
and Cognition, 43, 723-735. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-015-0504-
8 
Haran, U., Ritov, I., & Mellers, B. A. (2013). The role of actively open-minded 
thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration. Judgment 
and Decision Making, 8, 188-201. 
Hunt, T. E., Clark-Carter, D., & Sheffield, D. (2011). The development and 
part validation of a UK scale for mathematics anxiety. Journal of 
Psychoeducational Assessment, 29, 455-466. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0734282910392892 
Hutchins, E. (2010). Cognitive ecology. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 705-
715. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01089.x 
Hutto, D. D. (2005). Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 389-405. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9001-z 
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  44 
Ingold, T. (2010). The textility of making. Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
34, 91-102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cje/bep042 
Järvilehto, T. (1998). The theory of the organism-environment system: I. 
Description of the theory. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral 
Science, 33, 321-334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02688700 
Kaplan, C.A., & Simon, H.A. (1990). In search of insight. Cognitive 
Psychology, 22, 374-419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-
0285(90)90008-R 
Kirsh, D. (2013). Thinking with external representations. In S. J. Cowley, & F. 
Vallée-Tourangeau (Eds.), Cognition beyond the brain: Interactivity, 
cognition and human artifice (pp. 171-194). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Kirsh, D. (2014). The importance of chance and interactivity in creativity. 
Pragmatics & Cognition, 22, 5-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.22.1.01kir 
Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., Haider, H., & Rhenius, D. (1999). Constraint 
relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25, 
1534-1555. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.25.6.1534 
Knoblich, G., Ohlsson, S., & Raney, G. E. (2001). An eye movement study of 
insight problem solving. Memory & Cognition, 29, 1000-1009. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03195762 
Köhler, W. (1925/1957). The mentality of apes. London: Penguin Books. 
Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in practice: Mind, mathematics and culture in 
everyday life. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  45 
Lydersen, S., Fagerland, M. W., & Laake, P. (2009). Recommended tests for 
association in 2×2 tables. Statistics in Medicine, 28, 1159-1175. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sim.3531 
Maier, N. R. F. (1930). Reasoning in humans. I. On Direction. Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 10, 115-143. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0073232 
Maier, N. R. F. (1931). Reasoning in humans. II. The solution of a problem 
and its appearance in consciousness. Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 12, 181-194. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0071361 
Manktelow, K. I., & Over, D. E. (1991). Social roles and utilities in reasoning 
with deontic conditionals. Cognition, 39, 85-105. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(91)90039-7 
Malafouris, L. (2013). How things shape the mind: A theory of material 
engagement. London: The MIT Press.  
Malafouris, L. (2015). Metaplasticity and the primacy of material engagement. 
Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness and 
Culture, 8, 351-371. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1751696X.2015.1111564  
Metcalfe, J., & Wiebe, D. (1987). Intuition in insight and noninsight problem 
solving. Memory & Cognition, 15, 238-246. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03197722 
Noë, A. (2012). Varieties of presence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
Oberauer, K., Schulze, R., Wilhelm, O., & Süß, H.-M. (2005). Working 
memory and intelligence-their correlation and their relation: Comment on 
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  46 
Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle (2005). Psychological Bulletin, 131, 61-65. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.1.61 
Ohlsson, S. (1992). Information-processing explanations of insight and related 
phenomena. In M. T. Keane & K. J. Gilhooly (Eds.), Advances in the 
psychology of thinking (pp. 1- 44). Hemel Hempstead, UK: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Ohlsson, S. (2011). Deep learning: How the mind overrides experience. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Patton, J.H., Stanford, M.S., & Barratt, E.S. (1995). Factor structure of the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 51, 768-
774. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1097-4679(199511)51:6<768::AID-
JCLP2270510607>3.0.CO;2-1 
Sirota, M., Juanchich, M., & Hagmayer, Y. (2014). Ecological rationality or 
nested sets? Individual differences in cognitive processing predict 
Bayesian reasoning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 198-204. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-013-0464-6 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational 
thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 161-188. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.127.2.161 
Steffensen, S. V. (2013). Human interactivity: Problem-solving, solution 
probing and verbal patterns in the wild. In S. J. Cowley, & F. Vallée-
Tourangeau (Eds.), Cognition beyond the brain: Computation, 
interactivity and human artifice (pp. 195-221). London: Springer-Verlag. 
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  47 
Steffensen, S. V. (2015). Cognitive probatonics: Towards an ecological 
psychology of cognitive particulars. New Ideas in Psychology, 
forthcoming. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.07.003 
Steffensen, S. V., Vallée-Tourangeau, F., & Vallée-Tourangeau, G. (2016). 
Cognitive events in a problem-solving task: Qualitative methods for 
investigating interactivity in the 17 animals problem. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 28, 79-105. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2015.1095193 
Toon, A. (2011). Playing with molecules. Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, 42, 580-589. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.08.002 
Unsworth, N., Heitz, R. P., Schrock, J. C., & Engle, R. W. (2005). An 
automated version of the operation span task. Behavior Research 
Methods, 37, 498-505. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03192720 
Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2012). Utilities in the 2-4-6 task. Experimental 
Psychology, 59, 265-271. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000152 
Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2013). Interactivity, efficiency, and individual 
differences in mental arithmetic. Experimental Psychology, 60, 302-311. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000200 
Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2014). Insight, materiality and interactivity. Pragmatics 
& Cognition, 22, 27-44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.22.1.02val 
Vallée-Tourangeau, G., Abadie, M., & Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2015). 
Interactivity fosters Bayesian reasoning without instruction. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 581-603. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039161 
INSIGHT WITH HANDS  48 
Vallée-Tourangeau, F., & Payton, T. (2008). Graphical representation fosters 
discovery in the 2-4-6 task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 61, 625-640. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470210701268039 
Vallée-Tourangeau, G., & Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2014). The spatio-temporal 
dynamics of systemic thinking. Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 21, 
113-127. 
Vallée-Tourangeau, F., & Vallée-Tourangeau, G. (2016). Thinking and 
deciding beyond the brain. In N. Galbraith, E. Lucas, & D. Over (Eds.), 
The thinking mind: The use of thinking in everyday life (essays in honour 
of Ken Manktelow). Hove: Psychology Press. 
Weisberg, R. W. (1995). Prolegomena to theories of insight in problem 
solving: A taxonomy of problems. In R. J. Sternberg & J. E. Davidson 
(Eds.), The Nature of Insight (pp. 157-196). Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Weisberg, R.W. (2015). Toward an integrated theory of insight in problem 
solving. Thinking & Reasoning, 22, 5–39. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2014.886625 
Weller, A., Villejoubert, G., Vallée-Tourangeau, F. (2011). Interactive insight 
problem solving. Thinking & Reasoning, 17, 429-439. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2011.629081 
Zhang, J., & Norman, D. A. (1994). Representations in distributed cognitive 
tasks. Cognitive Science, 18, 87-122. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1801_3 
 
